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The hazards from Earth Potential Rise (EPR) at existing distribution steel 
poles installed in a rural farming property were investigated. Different fault 
scenarios were identified as part of the project. The software package 
CDEGS was used to determine conservative allowable voltage criteria for the 
various fault scenarios and applicable fault clearing times. Touch voltages 
modelled in CDEGS were all below the allowable voltage criteria for the 
different size fault currents at all fault locations. Risk was calculated to 
quantify the hazard. The hazard from EPR can be considered low and the risk 
can be categorised as negligible. 
Voltages were modelled in CDEGS to assess the impact on animals, 
especially cattle. These voltages were also below the tolerable voltage criteria 
for the different fault scenarios, hence no mitigation was required. 
A safety analysis on the transfer to the Transmission Distribution -Multiple 
Earth Neutral (TD MEN) using the ARGON software package indicates that at 
the steel poles which have distribution transformers, the probability of fatality 
is already below 1 in 1,000,000 and can be further reduced by the installation 
of 6m deep earth rods adjacent and bonded to the steel poles.  
A study on increased generation caused increased fault currents which 
increased EPR levels causing a breach of allowable voltage limits and 
therefore creating a potential hazard at the site. 
Transmission level faults at the zone substation did not have an unsafe 
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This thesis investigates fault events on a model of a typical single phase spur 
on an overhead high voltage distribution network. An Earth Potential Rise 
(EPR) study is conducted using the Current Distribution, Electromagnetic 
fields, Grounding and Soil structure analysis software package (CDEGS) and 
a safety/risk analysis done on the EPR levels with the use of the ARGON 
software. DIgSILENT's Power Factory is used to calculate the existing 
network fault current levels for the specified single phase spur. A three phase 
synchronous generator is added to the grid to see the impact on network fault 
currents and EPR. 
3.1 The death of a policemen horse 
In 2011 a Policeman’s horse died after walking past a light pole in 
Kalamunda. Energy safety staff examined the light pole which was thought to 
be linked to the death of the police horse (Cox 2011). The investigation is on 
going to date. If the light pole was at fault then the death of the horse could 
have been caused by ventricular fibrillation of the horse’s heart due to Step 
Potential which is relatively large due to the stride distance of the EPR rise. 
 
3.2 Purpose 
This document captures the information, assumptions, and calculations used 
to perform earthing assessment at accessible conductive points located in the 
vicinity of MV earths introduced and/or affected as a consequence of steel 
poles as distribution poles 
The main aim of this report is to investigate hazards to the general public and 











4.1 Earthing of a single phase network 
Earthing is used as a means of protection on electrical utility's assets as well 
as a means of ensuring safety to humans and animals. When a fault occurs in 
a network the majority of the fault current is diverted into the ground and 
source (generator) via an earthing conductor. The earthing system is used to 
detect fault currents so that protection equipment such as fuses and reclosers 
can operate and clear the fault. 
Western Power operates a Single Phase Earth Conductor (SPEC) 
configuration for its single phase networks. Single phase networks are only 
used in areas where loads are small and far apart, such as rural or semi rural 
areas, which includes farm properties. 
In this configuration no neutral wire is run for the return of normal load current. 
Instead, an earth wire is used as a return path for normal load current as well 
as earth fault current.   
 
4.2 Generation 
Generation is directly proportional to network fault levels. As generation is 
increased, say by the addition of generators on the network either by the 
network operator or a private entity, so are the fault levels on that network. 
This increase on fault levels can cause an increase in EPR levels which can 
then have a negative impact on the safety of humans and/or animals as will 
be discussed in the chapters to come where the addition of a synchronous 
generator on the network is modeled. There are two main types of generators 
in use in large power systems. These are synchronous generators and 
induction generators.  
 
4.2.1 Synchronous machines 
Synchronous machines require the rotor to spin at a fixed speed which is 
relative to the frequency of the power grid (WesternPower 2011). 
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A synchronous generator can control its output voltage by changing the 
amount of current fed into the rotor winding. This method of voltage control 
has been the most cost effective in the history of generation. For this reason 
almost all generators are synchronous machines (WesternPower 2011).  
When there is a fault on the system, there is a rapid change in operation that 
creates a short-term difference between rotor speed and voltage frequency. 
This effect can be modelled by a different reactance called a sub-transient 
reactance, XS'' (Crebbin 2009). This reactance is usually smaller in value than 
the synchronous reactance, and leads to larger initial fault currents. Generator 
fault capability is usually measured by a generator's fault level. This is the 
current supplied by the generator when the terminals are short-circuited. A per 
phase impedance diagram for this short circuit is shown below. 
 
Figure 4-1 - short circuit single line diagram (Crebbin 2009) 
 




where If is the fault current, which, from figure 4-1, is given by 
 
Alternatively, if the fault level is specified for a generator, then its sub-transient 
reactance is given by 
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4.2.2 Induction machines 
Induction generators can be divided into three categories. These are fixed 
speed generators, Doubly Fed semi-variable speed generators and full 
variable speed generators (ABB 2013). 
 
Induction generators are used for wind power systems. The variable 
differences between rotor and stator frequencies can be used to moderate the 
variable speed of the wind (WesternPower 2011). 
 
Induction generators are not covered further in this report. 
 
4.3 Faults 
A fault on a power system is caused by a breakdown of insulation between 
the main electrical conductor(s) causing an interruption to normal power flow 
(WesternPower 2011). This insulation could be anything from air for an 
overhead line to the XLPE insulation layer of an underground power cable. A 
typical case of a fault to an overhead power line is when a vehicle crashes 
into a power pole and, as a consequence, the live conductor(s) fall to earth 
hence causing a short circuit fault i.e. insulation (gap) is removed. In order to 
avoid damage to the rest of the network, the faulted components are usually 
disconnected by ‘protection devices’ which consist of relays, circuit breakers 
and fuses. 
 
Some other factors that may cause the insulation to breakdown are 
(WesternPower 2011):  
• Temporary over-voltages on the power system, caused by system 
resonance, lightly loaded circuits etc.  
• Atmospheric conditions, such as lightning, wind, bush fires etc.  
• Pollution forming a current leakage path across exposed insulator pins  
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• Vermin (parrots are known to eat the insulation from an overhead High 
Voltage Aerial Bundled Conductor (HV ABC)) 
• Equipment failure due to old and outdated equipment 
• Human error (incorrect switching during a scheduled switching operation) 
 
Short circuit faults in a power system can be categorised into either balanced 
faults or unbalanced faults. 
 
4.3.1 Balanced fault  
A balanced three-phase fault occurs when all of the three phases of a power 
network are short circuited. In these faults the fault current flows through the 
conductors only and does not flow through ground, hence all three phases are 
affected evenly by the fault. A three-phase fault on a system generally causes 
the greatest amount of disruption to the power system. This is because the 
short-circuit disturbs all of the three phases (WesternPower 2011). These 
types of faults are very rare in a power system as all three phases are usually 
spaced apart in an overhead network. Bays, also known as a section of 
overhead conductor between two distribution power poles are kept short in 
order to stop conductors from clashing into each other. Over head LV 
networks use spacers which are placed at the centre of a bay to stop 
conductors from moving and clashing due to winds. A spacer is a non-
conductive long stick which is placed perpendicular to and on top of the 
overhead LV wires. 
 
4.3.2 Unbalanced fault  
An unbalanced fault occurs when fault currents flow unevenly through the 
phases. The most common kind of unbalanced fault is a ‘single-phase to 
ground’ fault. Other less common types of unbalanced faults are ‘two phase to 
ground’ faults and ‘two phase short circuit to ground’ faults. A common 
example of a single phase to ground fault is when a tree trunk falls on one of 
the phase conductors of an overhead network hence causing the conductor to 
break and fall to ground. 
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Single phase to ground faults can be intermittent, such as between trees and 
a phase conductor during high wind conditions. Intermittent faults are seen 
but ignored as they usually clear themselves hence the term intermittent. If 
however the fault event persists, then the protection device will usually clear 
the fault by isolating that particular section so that the cause of the fault can 
be determined and removed. 
 
4.3.3 Network impedance 
The total fault current in a network is a contribution of currents from all the 
generation sources as well as the stored energy in the magnetic fields of 
some motors. 
The impedance of a typical network increases with the installed length of 
conductors. If a fault occurs far from the source, this will result in a smaller 
short circuit current at the faulted location due to the large network 
impedance. Conversely, if a fault occurs close to the source/generation, the 
fault current at the faulted location will be very large due to the smaller 
impedance at this point. Ohms law is the basis to this effect because the 
voltage is constant and so the fault current is inversely proportional to the 
network impedance. 
When HV networks undergo maintenance due to poor conductors, or if the 
network capacity needs to be expanded due to increased loads, the 
distribution conductors are usually upgraded in order to allow for larger load 
currents to flow. New conductors have reduced impedances. Reduced 
impedances in a network reduce network losses but also cause an increase in 
the fault currents. This can be a problem, as will be detailed in the following 









5 Network modeling approach 
5.1 Software packages 
5.1.1 DIgSILENT PowerFactory 
This software is a digital simulation and Network calculation package. It is 
used for the analysis of industrial, utility, and commercial electrical power 
systems (DIgSILENT 2013). Version 14.0.525.1 of the software was used in 
this project. Some of the functions of the software include(DIgSILENT 2013): 
• Load Flow Calculation 
• Short-Circuit Calculation 
• Harmonics Calculation 
• Network Reduction 
• Parameter Identification 
 
The Short-Circuit Calculation function of PowerFactory was used to define the 
fault currents at several locations along the single phase spur line, shown in 
figure 5-2. 
The actual HV network was extracted from the Western Power database and 
was imported into the software. Single phase to ground faults were simulated 
at 3 sections of the spur line. Faults were simulated at: 
• Start of spur line 
• Centre of spur line 
• End of spur line 
 
Figure 5-1 summarises the calculated fault current size with respect to the 
fault location along the spur line. Fault currents are averaged out to three 
sizes for simplification. 
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Figure 5-1 - Fault current size with respect to fault location 
5.1.2 CDEGS 
The CDEGS software package was developed by Safe Engineering Services 
and Technologies Ltd (SESTech) for the purposes of accurately analysing 
problems such as grounding, electromagnetic fields and electromagnetic 
interference (SESTech 2013). The following functions of the CDEGS software 
were used for this project: 
 
• RESAP – Used  for Soil Resistivity Analysis 
• SESCAD – Used for drawing/modeling the earthing network 
• HIFREQ – Electromagnetic Fields Analysis for the network (for 
overhead objects) 
• MALZ – Frequency Domain Grounding / Earthing Analysis (for 
underground objects) 
 
CDEGS was used to calculate Earth Potential Rise, Step Voltage, Touch 
voltage, Transfer Voltage as well as the Allowable Voltage limits, which will be 
discussed in the upcoming chapters of this report. 
 
5.1.3 ARGON 
ARGON is produced by the Network Earthing Development team of Ausgrid 
and will be used in conjunction with the EG0, a power system earthing guide 
that was developed by the Energy Networks Association (Ausgrid 2013). 
ARGON is used to calculate the probabilities of fibrillation as well as the 
probabilities of fatality to a human being. This software will be used in Section 
8.2.1 of this report. 
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5.2 Project background 
The steel poles are located on various farms. Figure 5-2 shows the site area 
layout and locations of steel poles. An earthing analysis was carried out to 
determine the impact on safety in the vicinity of the steel poles. 
 
No further upgrade and/or reconfiguration work directly upstream of the 
project location are known at the time this study was carried out. Soil 
resistivity information was based on soil resistivity measurements that were 
done at two separate locations in the surrounding area. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 - Site plan with steel pole locations  
 
5.3 Assumptions and information 
Faults at the transmission level have not been considered for this report. 
 
The soil model was considered to be alike for all locations as well as the zone 
substation location. Any assessment done in this document is based on 
information available at the time of study. Whilst reasonable care has been 
taken in compiling the report and design assessment, the recommendations 
are believed to be conservative. 
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5.4 Protection data 
The protection information is summarised in table 5-1 below. This information 
was sent by the Western Power Distribution Network Planning Section. 
 
Table 5-1 - Protection settings 
Closest upstream protection for unfused earth location 
Protection equipment Recloser 
Location Start of spur 
E/F Pickup current (A) 15 Amps 
Time multiplier settings (TMS) 0.1 
Time current characteristics Very Inverse (VI) 
 
5.5 Soil resistivity 
Before undertaking a detailed design or assessment of a new or existing 
earthing system or earthing point, it is necessary to determine the electrical 
characteristic of the soil. This is done through a series of measurements. Soil 
resistivity measurements are taken by injecting current into the earth between 
two outer electrodes and measuring the resulting voltage difference between 
two potential probes placed along a straight line between the current-injection 
electrodes. 
 
The electrical properties of the earth are commonly characterised by its 
resistivity, ρ , or the resistance measured between two opposite faces of a one 
metre cube of earth (Figure 5-3), expressed in Ωm (Markiewicz 2004). 
 




Earth resistivity varies not only with the type of soil, but with moisture, 
temperature, salt content and compactness (see Figure 5-4). Usually in a 
section of earth, there are several layers, each having a different resistivity. 
Lateral changes may occur, but usually these are so gradual that they can be 
ignored because of its unpredictable behaviour. Resistivity is usually 
expressed and modelled as a function of depth.(IEEE 2012) 
 
Figure 5-4 - Effects of added salt, moisture and temperature on soil 
resistivity(IEEE 2012) 
 
Typical values for the resistivity of different kinds of soils are provided in 
Figure 5-5 and should serve only as an approximation to the resistivity of soil 
at given site. Further testing should always be carried out to determine the 




Figure 5-5 - indicative resistivity values for various materials (AS/NZS 2006) 
 
5.5.1 Methods of soil resistivity testing 
There are two main methods for measuring soil resistivity - The Wenner 
Method and the Schlumberger Method (IEEE 2012). The equipment is the 
same for both methods. Four stakes are driven into the soil, all at depth ‘b’ 
and at intervals ‘a’. A test current is passed between the two outer electrodes 
and the voltage is measured between the inner electrodes. The apparent 





Wenner Method (IEEE 2012):  
 
Electrodes are equally separated by a distance ‘a’. Then the resistivity in 















If ‘b’ is small, then the formula becomes: 
  aRπρ 2= , 
 
A rule of thumb is that approximately the average resistivity of the soil to the 
depth ‘a’ is given by a stake separation of ‘a’. 
The Wenner array is easy to apply and interpret but is the less effective of the 
two methods from an operational perspective. It requires the longest cable 
layout, largest electrode spreads, and because all four electrodes are moved 
simultaneously, it is more vulnerable to lateral variation effects (AS/NZS 
2006). Spacing can be done up to approximately 150m between stakes 
before interference between test leads becomes a concern. 
 
Figure 5-6 - Wenner Method (Danieleccc 2011) 
 
Schlumberger Method (IEEE 2012) 
 
 This method can be used when low potential readings are obtained with the 
Wenner method. Potential probes are brought nearer to the corresponding 
current electrodes. 
If the depth of burial of the electrodes ‘b’ is small compared to their separation 







Figure 5-7 - Schlumberger Method (Danieleccc 2011) 
 
5.5.2 Soil resistivity test equipment 
The soil resistivity testing was done with the AEMC Model 6472 Ground 
Resistance Tester (see figure 5-8). This device is designed to measure Bond 
Resistance, Ground Resistance, Soil Resistivity, Earth Coupling and Step & 
Touch Potential (AEMC 2013). 
 






5.5.3 Soil resistivity test results 
Four Soil Resistivity Tests were carried out. Tests 1 and 2 were conducted 
next to each other and Tests 3 and 4 were conducted together but at a good 
distance from the location of Tests 1 and 2. The RESAP soil model plots are 
shown in the appendices. The following set of tables shows the test results. 
 




























































Table 5-6 below shows the 3 layer soil model produced by RESAP. All 4 soil 
resistivity tests were combined in the RESAP module of CDEGS in order to 
produce the 3 layer soil model. 
 
Table 5-6 - CDEGS 3 layer soil model 
Recommended model: Impedance (ohm.m) Layer thickness (m) 
Top layer 348 0.4 
Middle layer 23 41 
Bottom layer 173 infinite 
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5.6 Modeling of Zone Substation 
The Zone Sub earth grid was originally modelled in MALZ as a single rod with 
a depth of 400m into the ground in order to attain 0.5 Ω for the total resistance 
of the zone substation earth grid. This rod was then modelled in SESCAD for 
analysis in HIFREQ. 
 
The actual Zone sub earth grid file which was produced for the design of the 
Zone substation was imported into this model for comparison with the 400m 
single stake. Figure 5-9 shows the zone substation earth grid in 3D 
 
The touch voltages at several locations were analysed for both the actual 
Zone sub earthing file and the 400m earth rod. No difference in touch voltage 
at the single phase spur was observed for the two cases. The reason for this 
















5.7 SESCAD Line model 
Table 5-7 summarizes the asset specifications as modeled in SESCAD.  
Wooden pole down earths were simulated at an average of every 450m. This 
means that down earths were installed at every second or third pole. Table 5-
8 shows the average bay lengths for the different conductor types where steel 
poles are installed. 
 
 








Radius (m) Identification 
Radius 
(m) 
Default 1 1 0 Copper Earth rods 0.0075
Computed 13 1 0.13015 steel poles 0.13655
Computed 1.64 1 0 7/4.75 AAAC 0.00715
Computed 13 1 0 SCAC conductor 0.00295
Computed 5.7 1 0 Fe conductor 0.002625
Computed 13 1 0.1315 steel poles 0.137
Computed 1.64 1 0 aluminium conductor 0.00375
 
 
Table 5-8 - Single phase spur steel pole average bay lengths 























5.8 Fault clearing time 
The fault clearing times of the upstream protection device for fault currents of 
200A, 100A and 40A were calculated by using the IEC Very Inverse Curve 





T = Fault clearing time 
If = Fault current 
Ipu = Pickup current 
TMS = Time Multiplier Setting 
 
Table 5-9 shows the calculated fault clearing times for the three different fault 
currents that were derived from the Power Factory model. 
 
Table 5-9 – Fault currents and fault clearing times 
Fault current (A) 200 100 40 





















6 Faults and hazard scenarios  
Three risk scenarios have been identified for single phase networks. The first 
two are the risks of step and touch voltages at the equipment pole sites at the 
time of an earth fault.  The third, a more onerous risk, is that of direct transfer 
onto the LV neutral in the event of an earth fault (TD MEN). 
Single phase to earth faults were simulated in SESCAD at locations indicated 
in figure 6-1. Three Different fault currents and clearing times as per table 5-9 
were considered for the fault locations. Faults at the beginning of the single 
phase spur were considered to be 200A, faults at the middle of the spur to be 
100A and faults at the end of the spur to be 40A. The applicable hazard 
scenarios are shown in Table 6-1. 
 
 




























1.  Step-Touch 
voltages at contact 
point between the 
earth and metallic 
pole 
Operator and public 




2. see figure 6-3 Step voltages 
between two points 
on the earth’s 
surface that are 2m 
distance from each 
other 




3 Direct transfer onto 
the LV neutral in 
the event of an 
earth fault (TD 
MEN). 
Contact with household 
assets connected to the 




6.1 Allowable voltage criteria (Human Beings) 
Table 6-2 below shows the conservative allowable touch voltages for the 
different fault currents. The allowable touch voltages were calculated as per 
the IEC fibrillation current curve (C1) in CDEGS. Section 5.5 of AS60479.1 
2010 states that the “C1 curve was established for a current path left hand to 
both feet, below which fibrillation is unlikely to occur. On and above this curve 
the chances of ventricular fibrillation increases” (AS/NZS 2010), which is 
unacceptable. For this reason the allowable touch voltages were calculated as 







Table 6-2 – Allowable voltage Limits for different fault currents 
Safety Calculations Table       
Fault current (A) 200 100 40 
Fault clearing time (s) 0.1 0.2 0.8 
Allowable Touch Voltage (V) 373.6 335.1 78 
IEC Standard Revision 2005     
Fibrillation Current Calculation IEC C1 curve     
Percent of Hand-to-Hand 
Resistance 75% (hand to 2 feet)   
Body Resistance Exceeded by 95% of population   
Surface layer No surface layer installed   
 
 
6.2 Allowable voltage criteria (Cattle) 
Voltage differences in the vicinity of the steel poles had to be analysed for the 
effect of EPR on cattle, as most farms have cattle. Curves used in the study 
were compiled for calves only, and can be considered as conservative. 
The minimum fibrillation current for a calf for a duration of 3 seconds is 0.31 A 
(AS/NZS 2002). The total body impedance used for this analysis was 850 Ω 
for current path from forelegs to hind legs as per Table 2 of AS/NZS 
60479.3:2002(refer to section 13 of this report for Table 2). Figure 6-2 below 
illustrates the current path circuit (ENA 2010). Figure 6-3 shows a typical 
animal step voltage scenario. 
The impedance of the top layer soil is considered conservative and is derived 




Figure 6-2 – prospective step voltage circuit (ENA 2010) 
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Vsp – Prospective Step voltage 
Zb – body impedance = 850 Ω 
Zss – shoe resistance = 0 
Zcs – impedance of top layer soil = 6 x ρ (top soil) = 6 x 348.87 (IEEE 2000) 
Ib – 3sec current that will cause fibrillation = 0.31A 
 
The prospective step voltage can be calculated as following; 
Vsp = Ib (Zb + Zss + Zcs) 
Vsp = 0.31(850 + (6 x 348.87)) 
Vsp = 912 V 
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7 Effects of an increase in the Earth Fault pick up 
current 
 
Earth fault pick up current on the protection device may increase due to future 
increases in the load hence requiring the installation of additional 
transformers. This will cause an increase in the fault clearing times which will 
then decrease the allowable voltage limits. 
Table 7-1 shows the effect on fault clearing times when the pickup current is 
increased from the original 15A to a new value of 20A, which is typical of a 
load increase. The results were obtained with the use of the IEC very inverse 
curve equation (SchneiderElectric 2013) which is shown again below for 
convenience. 
 
 (SchneiderElectric 2013) 
 
 
Table 7-1 - Effects of an increase in the E/F pick up current 
Effects of an increase in the E/F pick up current 
Fault current (A) 200 100 40 
Fault clearing time (s) 0.2 0.3 1.4 






















This section will summarize the results for the following events: 
• Touch and Step voltages for Humans and Cattle 
• TD MEN levels for Humans 
• Risk/cost analysis for the Reduction of the Transferred voltages to 
acceptable levels 
• Effects of increased generation 
• Effects of a transmission level fault at the zone substation 
 
8.1 Touch and Step Voltages 
Table 8-1 shows the maximum touch voltage for fault currents of 200A, 100A 
and 40A. These faults have been simulated at several different locations 
within the site of the project. Refer to Figure 5-1 for the likely fault current 
magnitude with respect to the location within the spur and also for a visual 
location of these faults. It can be seen that the maximum touch voltage of 
308.9V occurs at location A for a 200A fault. However, this is still below the 
safety threshold limit of 373.6V. Fault location H has the highest touch voltage 
of 178.6V for a 100A fault. The highest touch voltage for a 40A fault occurs at 
locations E and F of 47.9 and 47.8 respectively. These voltages again are 
below the specified allowable voltage limit of 78V. 
 
Table 8-2 shows the maximum 2m step voltages for a calf. A maximum step 
voltage of 352.2V occurs for a 200 Amp fault at location A. This step voltage 










Table 8-1 - reach Touch voltages at different fault locations 
  1m Reach touch voltage 1m Reach touch voltage 


















A 373.6 N/A N/A N/A 308.9   
B 373.6 N/A N/A N/A 135.2   
C 335.1  17   23.4  
D 78   6.9   17.1 
E 78 N/A N/A N/A   47.9 
F 78   47.8 N/A N/A N/A 
G 335.1  100   123.7  
H 335.1  178.6   150.4  
 
 
Table 8-2 - 2m step voltages for calves at fault locations adjacent to poles 
  2m step voltage 












A 912 352.2  
B 912 154.1  
C 912 21.6  
D 912 19.5 
E 912 54.6 
F 912 60.8 
G 912 141.1  




The values highlighted in green correspond to the touch voltage at the faulted 
structure. The size of the fault current is determined by the location of the fault 
on the single phase spur. Refer to figure 5-1 for a summary of the fault sizes 
with respect to location. 
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8.2 Transmission Distribution Multiple Earth Neutral (TDMEN) 
TD MEN is contact with Multiple Earth Neutral (MEN) connected metalwork 
(around a house) where the MEN or soil is affected by either Transmission or 
Distribution assets(ENA 2010). 
 
The EPR transfer to the MEN will be considered because of the existence of 
transformers which supply the rural properties that are connected to the MEN, 
and because any contact with LV MEN interconnected metalwork (for 
example, household taps) during either LV MEN voltage rise and/or soil 
potential rise could be dangerous. 
 
The plot in Figure 8-2 shows that only the faulted structure produces an EPR 
of 88V, which is above the maximum allowable voltage limit of 78V for a 40A 
fault with a clearing time of 0.8 seconds, as per Table 6-2. The EPR from the 
adjacent steel pole is below the allowable voltage limit. Hence TD MEN need 
only be considered for one structure - where there is a distribution transformer 
located on a steel pole - as this will be the only hazardous structure. On the 
plots in figures 8-2 and 8-3, Profile Number 1 refers to voltage rise at the 
structure and Profile Number 2 refers to the voltage rise one meter from the 
structure as shown in figure 8-1. Each spike on the plots represents a steel 
pole. 
 
The plot in Figure 8-3 shows the effect on EPR when installing a 6m earth rod 
adjacent to the steel pole. For a visual representation please of this refer to 
figure 8-1. 
With the installation of the 6m earth rod the EPR at the faulted pole is reduced 






Figure 8-1 - SESCAD model with 6m earth rod 
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Figure 8-2 - TD MEN Scalar Potential without earth rod 
Steel pole 






Profile number 1 
Profile number 2 
1m 




Figure 8-3 - TD MEN Scalar Potential with earth rod 
 
8.2.1 TD MEN Risk Assessment 
A risk assessment was conducted in ARGON for the EPR to the MEN which 
is described in section 8.2 of this report. The probability of single fatality was 
calculated using ARGON. Below is a list of the input data used in ARGON; 
 
ARGON Input Data 
Fault Frequency/ year: 0.1 
Fault duration (s):  0.8 
Contact scenario:  MEN 
Risk Assessment:  Individual 
Current Path:  Touch voltage 
Footwear Type:  standard footwear 
Soil resistivity (Ω):  200 
 
The overhead line fault rate is measured in faults/100km/year. For 11kV-33kV 
networks, the fault rate is 10 faults/100 km/year (ENA 2010). From Section 
8.2 it is clear that only the faulted structure breaches the allowable EPR limit 
and the adjacent structures have much lower EPR values that are below the 
maximum allowable voltage limit. Therefore faults anywhere else on the 
Allowable voltage limit 78 
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network should not cause unsafe EPR values on adjacent structures, and for 
this reason a value of 0.1 has been used as the fault rate (ENA 2010). Refer 
to Table E2 of EG0 for further information in regards to this value. 
 
The Energy Networks Association describes the Probability of Fatality as, 
“one in a million” (ENA 2010). In ARGON, for this particular case a voltage of 
158 V sets the Probability of Fatality below one in a million. Table 8-3 
summarizes the probabilities for fibrillation and fatality with and without the 
installation of a 6m earth rod. The probability of fatality for both cases is less 
than one in a million. The probability of fatality reduces by about a factor of 3 
with the installation of the 6m earth rod. The probability of fibrillation is also 
reduced by a factor of 3. 
 








Fault location without 6m earth rod 88 0.0014 4.115e^-8
Fault location with 6m earth rod 72 0.0004062 1.236e^-8
 
8.2.2 Risk cost benefit analysis 
 
A risk cost benefit analysis was conducted in order to see how much it would 
cost to reduce the risks that are shown in Table 8-3. Figure 8-4 shows the 
location and number of steel poles that would need to be deep earthed. The 
following is a summary of the potential costs that would be involved; 
 
Earth rod specifications and material/labor costing 
Diameter      = 15mm 
Length       = 2.4m 
Cost per rod (labor exclusive)   = $18 
Number of rods required for 6m deep earth rod =  2.5 
Number of Steel poles that have transformers =  3 
Total number of poles to be deep earthed  =  3 
Number of earth rods required    =  3 x 2.5 = 7.5 (say 8) 
Total cost of Rods     = 18 x 8 = $144 
 37
 
Total Labor costing (including travel)  = $1300 
 
Total cost      = $1444 
 
The total cost of $1444 is very small compared to the capital costs for the 
initial maintenance project. For this relatively small investment, the 
probabilities of fibrillation and fatality will be reduced as shown in Table 8-3. It 























8.3 Effects on EPR with added generation 
Generators are added to a network due to the increases in load in order to 
meet the increased demand. Other methods of meeting the demand are to 
increase generation at the source however that may involve the reinforcement 
of the existing network in order to transmit the increased power efficiently. 
This can be a very expensive and sometimes unfeasible option. A 1.0 MVA 
22kV 3phase Synchronous Generator was connected to the 3phase side of 
the single phase spur using the DIgSILENT Power Factory software. This was 
done in order to see the effect on network fault currents and EPR levels. 
Table 8-4 summarise the new fault currents and their respective touch 
voltages due to the added generation for all the faulted locations. When Table 
8-4 is compared with Table 8-1, it is clear that the fault currents have 
increased at all the fault locations. The effect of the added generator is more 
visible near the start of the spur line where the fault current has increased 
from the original 200A to 388A. The effects are not as visible at the end of the 
line as can be seen by the 10A increase from the original 40A to a new 50A. 
This is because of the increased network impedance at the end of the line due 
to the increased length of the line. The following facts can be drawn from this 
investigation: 
• Fault currents increased at all locations (with largest increases at 
the start of Spur) 
• EPR levels are increased 
Table 8-4 - Effect of added generation on fault currents and EPR levels 
  1m Reach touch voltage  1m Reach touch voltage  
















50 A  
fault  
A  373.6  N/A  N/A  N/A  600    
B  373.6  N/A  N/A  N/A  262    
C  335.1   23.3    32.1   
D  78    8.7    21.4  
E  78  N/A  N/A  N/A    60  
F  78    60  N/A  N/A  N/A  
G  335.1   137.4    169.5   
H  335.1   244.6    206   
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8.4 Effects of a 132kV Transmissions fault at the Zone 
Substation 
A single phase to ground transmission fault was simulated at the zone 
substation in order to see the EPR at Location A, as shown in figure 5-1. The 
voltage profile was drawn in SESCAD under the first couple of bays at the 
beginning of the spur in order to analyse the EPR. The value of the single 
phase to ground transmission fault was given as 5.104kA. 
 
Figure 8-5 illustrates an earthing grid for a typical 132kV/22kV zone 
substation. During a fault at the zone substation some of the fault current can 
flow through the earthing wire to other locations which could cause unsafe 
EPR levels at those locations. In this particular case, 2927 Amps travels 
through the earth wire away from the zone substation. 
Figure 8-6 shows the current flowing along the down earth at location A. 
The figure is a plan view of Location A, the top two horizontal conductors 
represent the Phase and the earth conductors and the vertical conductors 
represent down earths at power poles. Clearly this current is very small 
because of the large distance between location A and the zone substation. 
Figure 8-7 shows the maximum touch reach voltage at 1m from the down 
earth. This figure is a bird's eye view of Location A. The maximum touch 





Figure 8-5 - A 5.104kA transmission fault at zone substation 
 
 



































The following facts can be concluded from this EPR assessment: 
 
1. The maximum allowable touch voltage criteria determined by CDEGS 
are 373.6V, 335.1V and 78V for fault clearing times of 0.1 s, 0.2 s and 
0.8 s respectively. This is based on the IEC fibrillation current curve C1 
(AS/NZS 2010) and IEEE 80 (IEEE 2000).  
2. Touch reach voltages modelled in CDEGS for the specified fault 
currents at the selected areas for contact with the steel poles were 
within the allowable voltage limits. Therefore, no further action is 
required. 
3. Step voltages modelled in CDEGS for animal safety were also below 
the allowable voltage limits for the different size fault currents at all the 
simulated fault locations, hence no mitigation was required. 
4. A safety assessment using ARGON on TD MEN indicates that at the 
steel transformer poles the probabilities of fatality are below the 
negligible risk value of one in a million. However these risks could be 
further reduced by installing 6m deep earths adjacent to the poles. 
5. Increased generation caused increased fault currents and this 
increased EPR levels which then caused a breach of allowable voltage 
limits. This increased EPR level can have a negative impact on the 
safety of humans and/or animals. It is however very unlikely that a 
generator of this size will be added to this area in the network. 
6. Transmission level faults at the zone substation did not have an unsafe 





10 Recommendation and future work 
Although the probability of fatality (for the case where deep earth rods are not 
installed) is already below the negligible risk levels as calculated in ARGON 
(i.e. < 10^-6), it is recommended that 6m deep earth rods are installed at the 
three steel transformer poles as per Section 8.2.2 of this report. By doing this, 
the probabilities can be even further reduced, at modest cost. 
 
A three phase network could be modelled to investigate metro locations 
instead of rural areas. Fault types (such as three phases to ground) can be 
investigated. An EPR study can be conducted to investigate step potentials on 
other animals such as horses. Individual soil resistivity tests could be 
conducted and used individually for the fault location closest to the test points 
instead of merging all soil tests into one. This will reduce errors however not 
































This assessment needs to be reviewed if any major change in site 
configuration. 
The scope of the project is based on the current design standards and 
external regulations and requirements. Should any of these change, the 
scope might be affected. 
The results and conclusions produced are valid based on the given inputs and 
assumptions mentioned in this report. Any significant change in assumptions 
and/or the system specifications (i.e. significant increase in the fault level, 
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13.1 Tables and Figures from AS60479 and EG0 
 
Table 13-1 - Table 4 (AS/NZS 2002) 
 
 










Figure 13-2 - Figure 20 of AS/NZS 60479.1 2010 (AS/NZS 2010) 
 
 




13.2 RESAP soil model plots 
 
Figure 13-3 - Plot for Soil Test 1 
 
Figure 13-4 - Plot for Soil Test 2 
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Figure 13-5 - Plot for Soil Test 3 
 
Figure 13-6 - Plot for Soil Test 4 
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13.3 Power Factory Model 
 
 
Figure 13-8 - Power Factory Model 
 
 




Figure 13-10 - Power Factory Model - Synchronous Generator Connection 
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13.4.3 Risks at 72V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
